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Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution:
Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism
Joan C. Williams*

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, since about 1980, has been painted as a feminist committed
to “formal equality.” Recent work has contested this depiction. This Article uncovers
additional evidence that Ginsburg’s goal was not mere formal equality; her goal was to
deconstruct the breadwinner-homemaker system in which men and women were seen as
belonging to separate spheres. Ginsburg saw this system as subordinating women, and in
that sense is an antisubordination theorist. Yet lumping her together with Catharine
MacKinnon, often seen as legal feminism’s foremost antisubordination theorist, proves
confusing for a number of reasons. A chief difference is their attitudes towards men.
While MacKinnon often paints men as oppressors, Ginsburg saw men, as well as women,
oppressed by gender roles. Ginsburg is more accurately seen as a reconstructive feminist,
whose chief goal is to deconstruct separate spheres—its breadwinner-homemaker roles
and the descriptions of men and women that justify them—and to reconstruct gender
along different lines. Today, progress towards her goal has stalled. The key to
jumpstarting the stalled gender revolution is to change gender pressures on men. Much of
this work involves cultural shift, but in recent years, progress has been made in litigating
separate spheres under Title VII, as evidenced by the recent growth of litigation involving
family responsibilities discrimination (“FRD”). The Article concludes with a critique of a
recent FRD case, EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.
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brilliant work on family responsibilities discrimination law. Thanks, too, to Jim Finberg of Altshuler
Berzon LLP, and a member of the Board of WorkLife Law, for his support and his expert and
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Introduction
For someone who has been called the Thurgood Marshall of
women, who some say has had a greater impact on American law than
1
any living judge, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has received remarkably
2
little attention among legal feminists. For decades, she was consigned to
the dustbin of formal equality, as someone obsessed with treating men
and women the same under the law, to women’s detriment, even when
3
the two groups were clearly different. More recently, Neil Siegel and
Reva Siegel have contested that characterization, arguing that Justice
4
Ginsburg should be seen through an antisubordination lens. Siegel and
Siegel make an important point. As we shall see in Part I, Ginsburg
consistently used antisubordination language not just in the Struck v.
5
Secretary of Defense brief analyzed by Siegel and Siegel, but in many
briefs dating from that period. In retrospect, it is a bit shocking that
scholars, for so long, looked at the judicial opinions that bleach out
Ginsburg’s antisubordination language almost completely as evidence of
6
what early legal feminists thought.

1. Peter J. Rubin, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 825, 825
(2009).
2. Cf. Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Nominated: “Thurgood Marshall of Gender Equality Law,” USA
Today, June 15, 1993, at 1A.
3. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal
Equality, in Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic 216, 231 (Earl M. Maltz ed.,
2003).
4. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771, 774 (2010). See generally Neil S. Siegel,
“Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 799 (2009).
5. 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 3, at 231.
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But while it is more accurate to see Ginsburg as focused on
antisubordination than as focused on empty formal equality, that
characterization, too, ultimately proves confusing. If you compare
Ginsburg’s approach with that of Catharine MacKinnon, legal feminism’s
foremost antisubordination theorist, the limitations of lumping the two
under a single name become readily apparent. The most obvious
divergence concerns their attitudes towards men. Men, in MacKinnon’s
7
vision, are subordinators. Ginsburg sees men in a far more sympathetic
light, as people whose lives are also impoverished by traditional gender
8
roles. Ginsburg’s use of antisubordination language proves not that she
is in MacKinnon’s camp, but that MacKinnon does not have a monopoly
on the insight that gender “differences” involve gender hierarchy.
Ginsburg is best understood as a reconstructive feminist, with a very
concrete vision of what the world would look like if gender roles changed
as she thinks they should. Cary Franklin argues persuasively that
Ginsburg brought over from her studies in Sweden the view that gender
9
roles choke off the human potential of men as well as women. Ginsburg,
from the beginning, has been guided by a very concrete vision of what
men’s and women’s lives will look like following a whole-scale
dismantling of separate spheres. Part II explores this interpretation of
10
Ginsburg as a reconstructive feminist on the work-family axis.
Part III picks up where Justice Ginsburg left off. Sadly, the past
fifteen years have seen a stall in the gender-role revolution Justice
Ginsburg helped to spark. To jumpstart that stalled revolution, I argue
that contemporary feminism should follow her example and place
masculinity at the center of a reconstructive analysis. Studies of
masculinity, unavailable in Ginsburg’s ACLU days, point the way. This
topic is discussed in Part III.A.
Research not available in Ginsburg’s ACLU days also documents
that change for men needs to be matched with change for mothers, a
topic discussed in Part III.B. Recent studies document that
discrimination against mothers, called “maternal wall bias,” is by far the
11
strongest and most open form of gender bias. Part III introduces this
social science and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s

7. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality 769 (2001) (“[S]exual subjection [by men] is
integral to sexuality as normally experienced . . . .”).
8. See infra notes 74–78.
9. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 97–104 (2009).
10. Joan C. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do
About It 4–6 (2000).
11. Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?,
112 Am. J. Sociology 1297, 1297 (2007); Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The
Maternal Wall, 60 Soc’y for Psychol. Study Soc. Issues 675, 677 (2004).
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(“EEOC”) 2007 enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination,
which together have catalyzed a rapidly growing area of employment law
that protects the rights of mothers to work and fathers to participate in
family care. This Article ends with a more sustained analysis of a recent
important case that is fundamentally inconsistent with the lessons Justice
13
Ginsburg taught us: EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.

I. Ginsburg as an Antisubordination Theorist?
Reva Siegel and Neil Siegel are dead right to link Justice Ginsburg
with antisubordination rhetoric. The Struck brief upon which Siegel and
14
Siegel focus this attention is not an aberration. If one examines the
briefs from the landmark 1970s cases Ginsburg was involved with under
the auspices of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, they are replete with
antisubordination rhetoric.
The 1971 amicus brief Ginsburg co-wrote in Reed v. Reed uses the
terms “inferior,” “subordinate,” “subordination,” and “second-class”
15
repeatedly. For example, she wrote: “American women have been
stigmatized historically as an inferior class and are today subject to
16
pervasive discrimination.” In 1972, in the case that was to become
Frontiero v. Richardson, Ginsburg and co-authors used the terminology
“subordination” or “inferiority” twelve times, reiterating that
“[h]istorically, women have been treated as subordinate and inferior to
17
men.” Relying heavily on the new social history, the brief recalls that
“[t]he common law heritage, a source of pride for men, marked the wife
as her husband’s chattel, ‘something better than his dog, a little dearer
18
than his horse.’” “Prior to the Civil War,” it continues, “[Southern]
19
white women ranked as chief slave of the harem.” “Activated by
feminists of both sexes, legislatures and courts have begun to recognize
and respond to the subordinate position of women in our society and the
second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon
20
them.” Gender subordination continues up to the present day, the brief
argues. “The challenged classification . . . assumes that the man is the

12. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities (2007).
13. 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
14. See generally Siegel & Siegel, supra note 4.
15. Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (“[T]he distance to
equal opportunity for women—in the face of pervasive, social, cultural, and legal roots of sex-based
discrimination—remains considerable.” (footnote omitted)).
16. Id. at 25.
17. Brief of ACLU Amicus Curiae, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694).
18. Id. at 13 (quoting Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall, in Poems (1842)).
19. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 18.
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dominant partner in a marriage and that the woman occupies a
21
subordinate position . . . .”
The Struck brief, also written in 1972, sounds many of the same
notes. It decries “the subordinate position of women in our society and
the second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon
22
23
them.” Women are “relegated to an inferior legal status”; like blacks,
they have “the stigma of inferiority and second-class citizenship
24
associated with them.” This brief again relies heavily on nonlegal
materials: “For if women have only a place, clearly the rest of the world
25
must belong to someone else and, therefore, in default of God, to men.”
26
The “presumably well-meaning exultation” of women “has impelled
27
them to accept a dependent subordinate status in society.” “Man’s
28
domination of woman” is referred to as an “historic fact.”
The 1973 brief in Kahn v. Shevin sounds the antisubordination
theme yet again. Following the “grandmother brief,” it again asserts,
“Historically, women have been treated subordinate and inferior to
29
men.” Kahn involved a tax exemption offered to widows but not
widowers. Ginsburg and her co-authors warned that “favors of this kind
30
come at an exorbitant price,” citing in the footnote Sarah Grimke’s
famous line (beloved of MacKinnon): “We ask no favors for our sex. All
31
we ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our necks . . . .”
The tax exemption, which appeared to benefit women, “perpetuates sex
stereotypes and thereby retards women’s access to equal opportunity and
32
economic life.” This is understandable, given that so few women are in
33
politics and therefore that “laws are drafted from masculine perspective.”
I could go on and on. Suffice it to say that the notion that Ginsburg
wanted lily-livered formal equality is woefully ill-informed. In retrospect,
21. Id. at 24.
22. Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178).
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 30. The constant analogies to race today seem dicey. They seemed less so in the 1970s.
Recall that it was Pauli Murray, a black feminist, who championed the race-sex analogy. See generally
Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 232 (1965). At the same time, Ginsburg and her colleagues were lobbying hard to
persuade the Court to apply strict scrutiny, which had been developed in the context of race, to sex.
25. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 22, at 38 n.35 (quoting Elizabeth Janeway, Man’s
World, Woman’s Place: A Study in Social Mythology (1971)).
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 41.
29. Brief for Appellants at 4, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1973) (No. 73-78).
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 16 n.11; see Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 45 (1987).
32. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 18.
33. Id. at 25.
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I am shocked that so many of us—myself included—read the Supreme
Court opinions in early equal protection cases as evidence of what
feminists thought rather than as evidence of what they could get Eight
34
White Guys to accept.
The early legal feminists not only embraced antisubordination
language, they kept on using it even after it became clear that their
antisubordination language did not appeal to the Supreme Court. In
1979, Ginsburg wrote (along with a lawyer at her husband Marty’s firm,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges) a brief in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co., which involved a challenge to a Missouri workers’
compensation law that offered automatic death benefits for the spouse of
a male worker, but required spouses of female workers to prove
35
incapacity or dependence. Statutes that offer “purported favors to
females as men’s appendages,” Ginsburg wrote in the brief, “downgrade
women’s status as workers and, in the cumulative effect, dampen
36
women’s aspirations and limit their opportunities,” by perpetuating a
“familiar stereotype—the dominant, independent man/subordinate,
37
dependent woman.” The brief complains that the equation of “widow”
with “dependent surviving spouse . . . reflects a traditional way of
38
thinking about females as inferior to males” and that the statute reflects
“archaic and overbroad generalizations about men as breadwinners and
women as dependents” dating from an era when “those in positions of
39
power accepted as axiomatic women’s subordination to men.” Ginsburg
and her co-author decried the “old accepted rules and customs
purportedly favoring women do so only in conjunction with a view of
40
them as men’s appendages.” These gals were antisubordination
firebrands.

34. Thurgood Marshall was not the problem. He understood that change needed to come at a
structural level, as evidenced in his decision in California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (“The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation [the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act] is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.” (quoting 123 Cong. Rec.
29,658 (1977))). Note how Marshall’s formulation neatly explains why treating women “the same”
entailed upholding their right to pregnancy disability leave; his language parsimoniously deconstructs
the masculine norm that “real” workers do not bear children.
35. Brief Amicus Curiae ACLU, Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1979) (No. 79381), 1979 WL 199959.
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id. at *10.
38. Id. at *19.
39. Id. at *35–36.
40. Id. at *45.
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II. Ginsburg as a Reconstructive Feminist
But they were not firebrands like MacKinnon. Just ask MacKinnon
herself: “I think the fatal error of the legal arm of feminism has been its
failure to understand that the mainspring of sex inequality is misogyny
42
and the mainspring of misogyny is sexual sadism.” MacKinnon’s focus
had been on sex, and in particular, one unhealthy kind of sex: the
43
eroticizing of dominance, whether through sexual harassment,
44
45
pornography, or rape. In MacKinnon’s view, “the eroticization of
46
dominance and submission [is what] creates gender.” Or, more
47
famously, “sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism.”
The conventional view within legal feminism is that “the sexual
48
realm is where dominance theory has the most to offer.” But this is
untrue. Both Ginsburg and MacKinnon are antisubordination feminists.
And yet lumping them together proves confusing. For one thing,
49
MacKinnon and Ginsburg are interested in different axes of gender.
MacKinnon focuses on the linkage of sexuality and dominance, while
Ginsburg’s chief concern was with work and family. Virtually all of the
cases in which Ginsburg involved the ACLU Women’s Rights Project
were challenges to the breadwinner-homemaker dyad. By my quick

41. This is not to say that no difference exists between Ginsburg and contemporary reconstructive
feminists. Ginsburg’s thinking was framed around the problems she faced, namely the need to
eliminate statutes that explicitly enforced sex-role stereotypes. Her solution was to eliminate gender as
a factor “in determining the legal rights of men and women.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1975). This kind of statement ultimately proved confusing,
particularly because of Ginsburg’s strategic decision to use the word “gender” rather than “sex.” Id.
at 1. Does this statement mean that people should never use sex (body shape) as a way of allocating
legal rights, or that they should never use gender (sex role) as a way of allocating legal rights? In my
view, Ginsburg meant the first but not the second. For example, the ACLU brief in Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (No. 77-1119), clearly advocated that anyone who played the caregiver role should be
entitled to alimony (that legal rights should follow sex role rather than body shape). This is what her
do-not-use-sex-as-a-proxy language was designed to communicate, as was her insistence on a “change
from gender to functional description.” Ginsburg, supra, at 12, 24. The understanding of Ginsburg and
others of her generation as “formal equality” feminists stems in significant part from the assumption
that when they said that legal rights should not follow gender, they meant that women marginalized by
caregiving should not have legal rights. This interpretation is understandable, but incorrect.
42. MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 5.
43. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979).
44. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. Rev.
793, 796 (1991).
45. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International
Dialogues (2006).
46. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 50.
47. Id. at 48.
48. Katharine T. Bartlett & Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine,
Commentary 282 (5th ed. 2010).
49. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 110–
15 (2010) (identifying three axes of gender: work-family, sex-violence, and queer).
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count, twelve out of fourteen of these early cases aimed at disestablishing
the men-as-breadwinner-women-as-dependent-caregiver paradigm of
50
separate spheres. In cases that did not directly involve the breadwinnerhomemaker dyad, the ACLU briefs focus on deconstructing the
descriptions of men and women that justify the breadwinner as the
“natural” role for men and the caregiver as the “natural” role for
51
women. Ginsburg’s message was, and has always been, that men can be
caregivers and women can be breadwinners, and (to quote her former
clerks Susan Williams and David Williams) that “we are human beings
with a full emotional palette even in the workplace, and we are thinking,
52
analyzing people, even at home.”
The second major difference between these two antisubordination
theorists is their attitude towards men. MacKinnon typically paints men
as oppressors, pure and simple. Men, MacKinnon tells us, do not want to
hear that Linda Lovelace (of Deep Throat) did not like the sex; “[m]en

50. See Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (challenging a pension system that charged
women more than men on the grounds that they live longer). For analysis of how this relates to
separate spheres, see Williams, supra note 49, at 129–30; see also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142 (1980) (challenging a workers’ compensation law that offered automatic death benefits to
wives but required husbands to prove incapacity or dependency); Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76
(1979) (challenging a welfare program that offered benefits to the families of unemployed men but not
to the families of unemployed women); Orr. v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (challenging an alimony law
that limited alimony to women); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (challenging an
employer’s policy of denying seniority status to women returning from pregnancy leave); Vorchheimer
v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1976) (challenging an all-boys public school and stressing the career
benefits to girls of attending the school); Mathews v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (challenging a
social security survivor benefits program that required surviving males, but not females, to prove
dependence); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1974) (challenging the denial of
pregnancy benefits in a comprehensive insurance scheme); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1974)
(challenging a system that allowed women to opt out of jury service on grounds of their family
responsibilities); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974) (challenging a social security survivor
benefits program that limited eligibility to widows); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(challenging a military program that offered medical and other benefits automatically to the wives of
servicemembers, but required husbands to prove dependence); Struck v. Sec’y of Defense, 410 U.S.
1921 (1972) (challenging an Air Force officer’s discharge due to her pregnancy); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (challenging a statute that gave automatic preference to men over women in
administering relatives’ estates). The two cases I found for which the Women’s Rights Project wrote
briefs that did not deconstruct separate spheres were Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Ginsburg was vociferous that she did not support the bringing of the
lawsuit in Craig v. Boren and only got involved to protect the gains attained in other cases.
51. See generally Motion of ACLU for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus
Curiae, Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (No. 75-628) (arguing that the Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to men younger than 21 and to women younger than 18 reinforced imagery of women as
passive and men as active risk takers); Brief Amici Curiae for the ACLU, Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (No. 755444) (challenging the death penalty for rape, which stressed that rule’s linkage with the tradition of
women as property (and racism)).
52. Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams, Sense and Sensibility: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Mentoring Style as a Blend of Rigor and Compassion, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 589, 593 (1998).

Williams_63-HLJ-1267 (Do Not Delete)

June 2012]

6/24/2012 8:28 PM

GINSBURG & RECONSTRUCTIVE FEMINISM

1275
53

believe what turns them on” (that is, eroticized violence). Occasionally
54
MacKinnon acknowledges differences among men but these moments
are fleeting. MacKinnon pays little attention to distinguishing between
men and the unhealthy traditions of masculinity she critiques so searingly
well: MacKinnon’s view is that “what turns men on, what men find
55
beautiful, is what degrades women.” When men sexually harass women,
she notes, “[i]t doesn’t mean they all want to fuck us, they just want to
56
hurt us, dominate us, and control us, and that is fucking us.” No wonder
57
MacKinnon’s view is that women are “born, degraded, and die.”
Ginsburg’s view of men could not be more different. Thanks to Cary
Franklin’s brilliant excavations, we now know that Ginsburg brought her
views on gender over from the Sweden of the 1960s, where a full-fledged
assault had been launched to deconstruct the separate spheres’ dichotomy
between men, defined as beings whose nature suited them perfectly for
market work and public life, and women, defined as beings whose nature
58
suited them perfectly for family work and private life. The goal in Sweden
was to effect structural changes in the organization of market work and
family work and in the ideology of what men and women are “really like,”
to enable both men and women to live up to their full human potential,
59
freed from the straitjacket of conventional gender roles. Swedish
advocates argued that “imprisonment in the masculine role is at least as
great a problem to men as conformity to a feminine ideal is to women” and
“that a debate on liberation and equality must be about how men as well
60
as women are forced to act out socially determined stereotypes.”
This very precisely describes Ginsburg’s reconstructive vision:
[W]ere I Queen, my principal affirmative action plan would have three
legs. First, it would promote equal educational opportunity and
effective job training for women, so they would not be reduced to
dependency on a man or the state. Second, my plan would give men
encouragement and incentives to share more evenly with women the
joys, responsibilities, worries, upsets, and sometimes tedium of raising
children from infancy to adulthood. (This, I admit, is the most
challenging part of the plan to make concrete and implement.) Third,
the plan would make quality day care available from infancy on.
53. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 11.
54. Id. at 41 (“Men who do not rape women . . . . Men who are made sick by pornography . . . .”).
55. Id. at 91.
56. Id. at 92.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Franklin, supra note 9, at 97–105. Justice Ginsburg views reproductive rights through the
same prism, namely a concern that laws limiting reproductive rights may impede a woman’s ability “to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.” See Mickey Kaus, Moderate Threat,
New Republic, July 12, 1993, at 6 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
59. Franklin, supra note 9, at 100.
60. Id. at 101 (quoting Hilda Scott, Sweden’s “Right to Be Human”: Sex-Role Equality: The
Goal and the Reality 43 (1982)).
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Children in my ideal world would not be women’s priorities, they
61
would be human priorities.

During my on-stage interview with Ginsburg last September, I asked her
whether her chief goal had been to challenge separate spheres. She
62
replied, “Of course that’s what I was trying to do.”
63
I also asked what was her favorite comfort food. Ginsburg thought
a bit, and then replied that her favorite comfort food was her husband
64
Marty’s homemade French bread. She loves to talk about how good a
cook Marty was, and about when Marty and their daughter kicked her
65
out of the kitchen because she was such an uninspired cook. She also
loves to tell the story of what she tartly told her son’s school when they
were calling her constantly as he went through a particularly frisky phase.
66
“This child has two parents,” she said. “Next time call his father.” She
tells this story a lot, and repeated it in our interview. She once told a
reporter that her ideal is well expressed by the 1970s Marlo Thomas song
“Free to Be You and Me” which inspired her view “[t]hat the male or
female, you should be free to follow your star, to develop your talent,
67
and you shouldn’t be held back by artificial barriers.” “But what is very
hard for most women,” she continues, “is what happens when children
are born. Will men become equal parents, sharing the joys as well as the
burdens of bringing up the next generation? But that’s my dream for the
world, for every child to have two loving parents who share in raising the
68
child.”
Unlike MacKinnon, whose chief strength is her eloquence in
deconstructing current institutions, Justice Ginsburg offers a clear
reconstructive vision. And yet this vision embeds a central ambiguity.
Often Ginsburg speaks of her ideal as one in which both parents
participate simultaneously in market work and family work. Yet at other
times, she seems more focused on making the world safe for role
switching—for men to be caregivers and women to be breadwinners. She
often speaks of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld and makes it clear that Stephen
69
Wiesenfeld’s devotion to his son deeply touched her. “Just as Paula
61. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on the 1980’s Debate over Special Versus Equal
Treatment of Women, 4 Law & Ineq. 143, 146 (1986).
62. Legally Speaking: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U. Cal. Television (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.uctv.tv/
search-details.aspx?showID=22928.
63. Id. Many thanks to WorkLife Law Board Member Michele Coleman Mayes for suggesting
this question.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview: Trailblazing Advocate for Women’s Rights, Acad. of
Achievement, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/gin0int-5 (last visited May 1, 2012).
68. Id.
69. Id.

Williams_63-HLJ-1267 (Do Not Delete)

June 2012]

6/24/2012 8:28 PM

GINSBURG & RECONSTRUCTIVE FEMINISM

1277

Wiesenfeld’s status as a breadwinner is devalued so Stephen
70
Wiesenfeld’s parental status is denigrated,” said the brief. Judges who
heard the case were extremely skeptical, or downright certain, that
Stephen Wiesenfeld did not actually want to stay home. The brief
expressed outrage:
Equally myopic, but impossible to explain in light of his own
contemporaneous pronouncements is appellant’s reference in this
Court, as in the court below, to appellant’s advanced degrees and his
ability to command a substantial salary. If Jason Paul’s surviving parent
were a woman, any suggestion that her academic degrees and
intellectual capacity indicated she should choose remunerative
employment over personal attention to her new newborn child
71
undoubtedly would be dismissed with alacrity.

Whether Ginsburg wants to deconstruct separate spheres or simply
people them with humans of a different body shape, one thing is clear:
Like Olof Palme in the 1960s, she has a clear reconstructive vision, to be
reached by working in coalition with men and placing masculinity at
72
center stage. When asked why she had chosen to work through the
ACLU rather than through a women’s organization, said Justice Ginsburg
in 2009,
I always thought that there was nothing an antifeminist would want
more than to have women only in women’s organizations, in their own
little corner empathizing with each other and not touching a man’s
world. If you’re going to change things, you have to be with the people
73
who hold the levers.

A Washington Post reporter who interviewed Ginsburg in 1993 noted a
74
photograph of her son-in-law “gazing adoringly at his newborn child.”
The reporter quotes her as telling visitors, “This is my dream for
society . . . . Fathers loving and caring for and helping to raise their
75
kids.” Ginsburg’s focus on men explains her opposition to “special
treatment” for women. “Special benefits for women . . . result in
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated men, themselves victims of

70. Brief for Appellee at 11–12, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974) (No. 73-1892).
71. Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted).
72. Franklin, supra note 9, at 101–02; see Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting Palme: “[I]n
order that women shall be emancipated . . . men must also be emancipated.”).
73. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court: An Interview with Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, (Magazine), at 22, 25; see Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform
Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. &
Gender 251, 265–66 (2009).
74. David Von Drehle, Redefining Fair with a Simple, Careful Assault, Wash. Post, July 19, 1993,
at A1.
75. Id.; see Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1997,
(Magazine), at 60, 63 (“This is my dream of the way the world should be . . . . When fathers take equal
responsibility for the care of their children, that’s when women will truly be liberated.”).
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male sex-role stereotypes,” she asserted in the Kahn v. Shevin brief,
which also noted that “gender-based discrimination frequently impacts
77
adversely on both sexes” and decried the “fundamental unfairness to
78
men as well as women of legislative lines based on sex stereotypes.”
This theme emerged again in Orr v. Orr, the case that challenged a
statute that limited alimony to women:
The Alabama alimony statute unfairly and unconstitutionally
discriminates against husbands who elect to stay at home and care for
the family, or who, relying on their wives’ ability and desire to make
the major contribution to the financial support of the family, select a
less remunerative career, or who, because of involuntary disability, are
necessarily dependent on their wives.
....
. . . Thus, for example, a husband who would like to be a poet or a
painter and whose family can maintain an adequate living standard on
his wife’s earnings, is discouraged by the Alabama alimony statute
79
from fully developing his talent and pursuing his aspiration.

That brief also noted, in language reminiscent of Nevada
80
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, that “[f]ar more clearly, the
discrimination visited upon the husband by the Alabama alimony statute
stamps women as persons assigned a special place in a world controlled
by men. By steering the husband out of the home, it steers the wife into it
and keeps her there, thus discouraging wives from achieving economic
81
self-sufficiency.”
In the light of Ginsburg’s early briefs, it becomes clear that her
82
greatest Supreme Court triumph was not United States v. Virginia, as I
had always assumed. It was Hibbs, written by Justice Rehnquist, which
upheld the constitutionality of the Family and Medical Leave Act
83
(“FMLA”) as applied to state governments. In the light of Cary
Franklin’s work, Hibbs can be seen as channeling Ginsburg’s
reconstructive vision, virtually unchanged since the 1960s. Like many of
the cases that the Women’s Rights Project took on, Hibbs involved a

76. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 4.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Motion of ACLU for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979) (No. 77-1119), 1978 WL 206698, at *14, *18.
80. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
81. Motion of ACLU, supra note 79, at 27.
82. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
83. 538 U.S. 721. I have to admit that Justice Ginsburg herself does not agree. See Remarks of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, March 11, 2004, CUNY School of Law, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 221, 236 (2004)
(“[T]he Virginia Military Academy case was very satisfying because I regard it . . . [as] the culmination
of the litigation in which I was engaged in the 1970s.”).
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84

man who wanted to care for a family member. William Hibbs, who
worked for the state welfare department, was fired when he took time off
to care for his wife after she was very seriously injured in an auto
85
accident. Much to the astonishment of constitutional law scholars,
Rehnquist limited the federalism doctrine he himself had championed,
86
which used the Tenth Amendment to reign in Congressional power.
87
Ginsburg’s handprints are all over Hibbs. It involved a statute
Ginsburg cared deeply about: the FMLA, championed by Judith
Lichtman’s Women’s Legal Defense Fund (now the National Partnership
for Women and Families). Lichtman had co-authored some of the early
Women’s Rights Project briefs with Ginsburg and had hung tough,
resisting pressure to accept a national maternity leave statute in favor of
a statute that applied to men as well as women. This was a controversial
move, but it is one Ginsburg has defended. For her, the FMLA expresses
a key tenet of reconstructive feminism: Ginsburg sees the FMLA as
reflecting not a commitment to treat men and women the same, but a
commitment to change existing masculine norms, substituting new norms
88
that include the experience of women. The FMLA does this, she would
argue, because it changes the definition of the ideal worker by sending
the message that caregiving—both self-care and care of others—naturally
plays a role in adults’ lives, and that employers should be prohibited
89
from penalizing adults who need time off for caregiving.
Ginsburg had been arguing as much since the 1970s. In her 1971
article Gender and the Constitution, she argued that women needed
90
“affirmative action” in order to achieve true equality. The “overriding
objective must be an end to role delineation by gender, and in its place,
conduct at every school level, [and] later in the job market, signaling that
in all fields of endeavor females are welcomed as enthusiastically as
91
males are.” What this entailed was not to treat men and women the
same in the face of norms designed around men, in the way that “formed

84. 538 U.S. at 725.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a Success (?) of Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 541, 544–55 (2005).
87. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., id.; Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Listen
to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. City. L. Rev. 213, 218–19 (2004).
88. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of
the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 9, 18 (“[The FMLA] . . . takes women at work as the model . . . but
spreads out to shelter others: men and women who need time off not only to care for a newborn, but
to attend to a seriously ill child, spouse, elderly parent or self.”); cf. Williams, supra note 49, at 77–108
(discussing the need to deconstruct masculine workplace norms and replace them with norms that
include the traditional life patterns of women).
89. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 29.
90. Id. at 28–34.
91. Id. at 29.
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equality” feminists have often been characterized. Her goal, instead, was
“eliminating institutional practices that limit or discourage female
92
participation.” For example:
[D]eferral of an education to raise a family or to finance the education
of a spouse might be regarded with the same favor as accomplishments
of college athletes or politicians. . . . Extended study programs might
be provided for students unable to undertake full-time study because
of special family obligations that cannot 93be met by customary financial
aid (notably, care of preschool children).

Later on in the same article, Ginsburg wrote, “If we are genuinely
committed to the eradication of gender-based discrimination, the
problem of job and income security for childbearing women workers
94
must be confronted and resolved head-on.” Comparative evidence “may
be useful”: she goes on to advocate (in the politest possible terms) for
“comprehensive income protection and medical benefits for pregnancy
and childbirth, financed through compulsory social insurance,” parental
leaves that can be taken by men or women, and comprehensive, non95
96
means-tested child care. She argued (as I did thirty years later) that it
is inconsistent with a commitment to gender equality to privatize the
costs of childrearing onto mothers, making the mothers’ “choice” to quit
less of a choice than a response to a workplace designed (to use my
terminology) around an ideal worker who takes no time off for
childbearing, childrearing, or anything else: someone with a man’s body
97
and traditional (breadwinner) life pattern. “We will continue to
shortchange parents, particularly mothers, and children until childrearing
burdens are distributed more evenly among parents, their employers,
98
and the tax-paying public.” In other words, Ginsburg—like a true
reconstructive feminist—defines equality as treating men and women the
same but only after deconstructing the existing norms defined by and
around men and masculinity, and reconstructing existing institutions in
ways that include the bodies and traditional life patterns of women.
99
This is the theoretical framework Rehnquist adopts in Hibbs. He
took what seemed at first glance a workers’ rights statute that gives all
eligible employees up to twelve weeks off a year to care for one’s self or

92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 31.
94. Id. at 38.
95. Id.
96. See generally Williams, supra note 10.
97. Id.
98. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 40.
99. See generally Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, You’ve
Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 Stan.
L. Rev. 1871 (2006).
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a family member with a serious health condition and defended it as a
gender bias statute, thereby allowing him to apply intermediate scrutiny
101
and uphold its constitutionality. Both Rehnquist’s language and his
logic come right out of the Women’s Rights Project briefs of thirty years
102
earlier. He decried the “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation
103
of family duties [that have] remained firmly rooted” and noted that
seven states’ leave statutes reinforced stereotypes by offering maternity
leave for women but no leave for men, “reinforc[ing] the very
104
stereotypes that Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA.” Like
Ginsburg before him, Rehnquist focused on men, noting that “[p]arental
leave for fathers . . . is rare. Even . . . [w]here child-care leave policies do
exist, men, both in the public and private sectors, receive notoriously
105
Rehnquist decried “the pervasive
discriminatory treatment . . . .”
106
presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second,”
concluding:
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. . . .
These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views
107
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.

I do not doubt that Justice Rehnquist had his own life experiences
that led him to recognize the importance of family caregiving: his wife
died of cancer when she was still relatively young, and he sometimes left
early from the Supreme Court to pick up his grandchild from day care in
108
order to help his divorced daughter. But I have little doubt that

100. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2010); see Ronald D. Elving, Conflict and Compromise: How Congress
Makes the Law 18–21 (1995) (discussing that Washington feminists opposed the maternity leave
advocated by a California Congressman and held out for the FMLA).
101. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 15–40.
103. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730.
104. Id. at 733.
105. See id. at 731 (emphasis and alternations in original) (quoting Parental and Medical Leave Act
of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor
Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 147 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank,
Director of the Yale Bush Center Infant Care Leave Project)).
106. Id. at 736 (quoting Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 100 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, Director of the Yale Bush Center
Infant Care Leave Project)).
107. Id.
108. Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2003, at
WK3 (“[Chief Justice Rehnquist’s] daughter, Janet, is a single mother who until recently held a highpressure job and sometimes had child-care problems. Several times this term, the 78-year-old Chief
Justice of the United States left work early to pick up his granddaughters from school.”).
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Ginsburg helped him interpret these experiences in a reconstructive vein.
She is one charming and persuasive lady.
When MacKinnon protested in 1987 that “[p]articularly in its upper
reaches, much of what has passed for feminism in law has been the
attempt to get for men what little has been reserved for women,” she was
embracing the then-current view of Ginsburg as obsessed with formal
equality for exceptional women who followed traditionally male life
109
MacKinnon, along with other feminist scholars, now
patterns.
110
But, as discussed,
recognizes Ginsburg’s antisubordination frame.
Ginsburg’s antisubordination frame is very different from MacKinnon’s—
so different that lumping them together is likely to prove confusing.
At issue is not simply the interpretation of Ginsburg. The larger
point is that the conventional association of antisubordination with
MacKinnon is oversimplistic. In fact, virtually every mainstream legal
feminist embraces antisubordination as a goal. This is true not only of
MacKinnon and Justice Ginsburg. It is also true of Carol Gilligan, whose
work was designed to end the subordination of what Gilligan saw as
111
women’s ways of reasoning and women’s different voice. Gilligan, at
core, protests the devaluation of the feminine, and its subordination to
112
values associated with men and masculinity. It is time to recognize that
antisubordination logic underlies every major school of legal feminism.

III. Reconstructive Feminism: Next Steps
A. Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Gender
Pressures on Men
As noted above, the antistereotyping vision in Sweden proposed
structural changes to enable both men and women to live up to their full
potential as human beings. In 1970, Olof Palme, one of the leaders of the
sex equality movement and later Prime Minister of Sweden, delivered his
manifesto “The Emancipation of Man”: “[I]n order that women shall be
emancipated from their antiquated role the men must also be
113
Palme explained, “[T]he culturally conditioned
emancipated.”
expectations of an individual on account of sex[] act as a sort of
109. MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 4.
110. Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Love Letter to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 31 Women’s Rts. L. Rep.
177, 181 (2010).
111. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
1–5 (1982).
112. Id.
113. Franklin, supra note 9, at 101–02 (alteration in original) (quoting Olof Palme, Swed. Prime
Minister, The Emancipation of Man, Address Before the Women’s National Democratic Club (June 8,
1970), in Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Herma H. Kay, Text, Cases and
Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 938 (1974)).
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114

uniform,” forcing men to comply with sex role stereotypes. In fact,
Palme argued, “the emancipation of men was the linchpin in the struggle
115
for sex equality.”
We need to listen up. In the thirty years since the Women’s Rights
Project litigated its landmark cases in the 1970s, the gender revolution
has stalled out in a big way. Men’s household contributions stalled out
116
around 1985. Mothers still spend nearly twice as much time as fathers
both doing core household tasks and caring for children as a primary
117
activity. About five years after fathers’ family work stalled out,
118
women’s workforce participation did, too. One out of every four
mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four remains out of the labor force,
and women’s average work hours remain far below full-time in an
119
economy that severely penalizes “part-time” work. Sex segregation has
decreased sharply for college graduates, but for other women it remains
120
very high, and has changed little since the 1990s.
To jumpstart the stalled gender revolution, I have argued elsewhere,
121
we need to change gender pressures on men. The conventional wisdom
is that the persistence of work-family conflict reflects women’s failure to
122
bargain effectively in the family. My hypothesis, instead, is that the
stalled gender revolution reflects the fact that gender pressures on men
remain largely unchanged.
These pressures are intense. Unlike womanhood, which is
understood to be a biological inevitability, manhood is seen as something
123
that has to be earned. Manhood is both elusive and tenuous—
124
something that has to be proven in public, over and over again. This
leads to “gender role stress,” which in many men is chronic: anxiety over
125
whether one is enough of a man. Actions that provide temporary relief
from this anxiety include “drinking heavily, driving fast, excelling at
114. Id. at 102 (quoting Olof Palme, Swed. Prime Minister, The Emancipation of Man, Address
Before the Women’s National Democratic Club (June 8, 1970), in Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg & Herma H. Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 941
(1974)).
115. Id.
116. Joan C. Williams et al., “Opt Out” or Pushed Out?: How the Press Covers Work/Family
Conflict 20 (2006).
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 21 fig.3.
119. Williams, supra note 10, at 2.
120. Williams et al., supra note 116, at 23 fig.7.
121. Williams, supra note 49.
122. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender
Divide 180–85 (2003).
123. Joseph Vandello et al., Precarious Manhood, 95 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1325, 1325–
26 (2008).
124. Id. at 1326–27.
125. Id. at 1327.
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sports, making lots of money, bragging about their sexual exploits, and
fathering many children,” according to experimental social psychologist
126
Joseph A. Vandello and his colleagues.
For most men, manhood remains intertwined with breadwinning.
Historians point out that when masculinity first became associated with
breadwinner status in the nineteenth century, anxiety became men’s
heritage. “Sons had to compete for manhood in the market rather than
grow into secure manhood by replicating fathers,” to quote one
127
historian. “The birthright of every American male is a chronic sense of
128
personal inadequacy,” chimed in another twentieth-century author.
The bulwark against inadequacy is to be “successful,” which means to be
successful at work. This makes it difficult for men to challenge the felt
mandate to live up to workplace norms. “I was talking to a friend of
mine, a partner at a major San Francisco law firm,” Derek Bok, former
president of Harvard University, told me in 2001. “He was always
complaining about how hard he worked, so I asked: ‘Then why don’t you
just work three-fifths as hard and take three-fifths the salary?’ He was
tongue-tied. But of course the real reason he couldn’t is that then he
129
feared he wouldn’t ‘be a player.’” This single quote goes a long way
toward explaining the provenance of work-family conflict among the
130
professional-managerial class.
In sociologist Pamela Stone’s study of highly educated women who
“opted out,” she found that husbands were a key influence on well over
131
half (sixty percent) of women’s decisions to quit. The “unspoken
backdrop against which these women’s decisions to quit are negotiated
132
and decided” is that men’s careers take precedence. As one mother put
it, explaining why she left her high-level job, “[My husband and I] were
both working these killer jobs. And I kept saying, we need to reconfigure
133
this. And what I realized was, he wasn’t going to.” Said one woman,
“He has always said to me, ‘You can do whatever you want to do.’ But
134
he’s not there to pick up any load.” These kinds of statements show the
flawed logic of the oft-repeated assertion that women just need to

126. Id.
127. Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846, at 246 (1991).
128. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, in The Gender of Desire: Essays on Male
Sexuality 35 (2005).
129. Email from Derek Bok, Professor, Harvard Univ., to Author (2007) (on file with Author)
(confirming statements made in 2010).
130. For a discussion of gender pressures on blue-collar men, see Williams, supra note 49, at 83–86.
131. Pamela Stone, Opting Out? Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home 62 (2007).
132. Id. at 65.
133. Id. at 61.
134. Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home,
596 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 62, 76 (2004).
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bargain better at home if they want equality at work. Women are fated to
lose on home-front negotiations so long as gender pressures on men
remain unchanged.
Men often say they want to spend more time with their families, and
have for a long time. Why don’t most deliver? Most feel they cannot
afford not to be a “player”: men not only have the right to perform as
ideal workers; most feel they have the duty to do so. According to a 1997
study, eighty-three percent of American women and an even higher
percentage of childrearing mothers felt their husbands should be the
135
primary providers. Americans see being a good provider as an integral
part of being a good father, according to another study; gender pressures
on men to be good fathers send them away from home, rather than
136
towards it.
Sad to say, feminism has not made things any easier. In fact, the
mainstream formulation is that feminism is about choices: A woman
should be able to choose whether she stays home or whether she
continues working. Think about it—the assumption is that women are
entitled to be supported by a man if they choose to be. Even feminism
has played a role in policing men into breadwinner roles.
To jumpstart the stalled gender revolution on the home front, we
need to open up a discussion about gender pressures on men at work.
These pressures are not subtle. To quote an engineer in Silicon Valley:
Guys constantly try to out-macho each other, but in engineering it’s
really perverted because out-machoing someone means being more of
a nerd than the other person. . . . It’s not like being a brave firefighter
and going up one more flight than your friend. There’s a lot of see how
many hours I can work whether or not you have a kid. . . . He’s a real
man; he works 90-hour weeks. He’s a slacker; he works 50 hours a
137
week.

A key place men earn their manhood is on the job. Marianne Cooper’s
brilliant study of Silicon Valley, “Being the ‘Go-To Guy,’” details this
138
process in the white-collar context. She shows that white-collar men
enact masculinity on the job, in a way that contests blue-collar men’s
claims that being a “real man” requires having the brute strength to do

135. Williams, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting Jean L. Potuchek, Who Supports the Family? 4
(1997)).
136. See generally Nicholas Townsend, The Package Deal: Marriage, Work and Fatherhood
in Men’s Lives (2002).
137. Marianne Cooper, Being the “Go-To Guy”: Fatherhood, Masculinity, and the Organization of
Work in Silicon Valley, in Families at Work: Expanding the Bounds 7 (Naomi Gerstel et al. eds.,
2002) (quoting engineer Scott Webster). For an example of the somewhat different ways gender
pressures on men operate in the blue-collar context, see Williams, supra note 49, 56–61 (discussing
“caring in secret” among blue-collar men).
138. See generally Cooper, supra note 137 (discussing masculinity as performed in white-collar jobs).
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hard, dirty jobs. This is a source of anxiety, because white-collar men’s
work is clean, gender-neutral knowledge work—pencil pushing—which
leaves white-collar men eager to shift the definition of manliness.
One way they do so is by interpreting long work hours as a heroic
140
activity (“He’s a real man; he works 90-hour weeks.”). Another example:
Even under normal circumstances, when there are no extraordinary
demands, you see people working 36 hours straight just because they
are going to meet the deadline. They are going to get it done, and
everybody walks around proud of how exhausted they were last week
and conspicuously putting in wild hours. It’s a status thing to have pizza
delivered to the office. So I don’t know why it happens, but I really feel
like it is kind of a machismo thing: I’m tough. I can do this thing. Yeah,
I’m tired, but I’m on top of it. You guys don’t worry about me. . . . The
people who conspicuously overwork are guys, and I think it’s usually
141
for the benefit of other guys.

“The successful enactment of this masculinity,” Cooper writes, “involves
displaying one’s exhaustion, physically and verbally, in order to convey
142
the depth of one’s commitment, stamina, and virility.”
Common, but unconvincing, are claims that this kind of peacocking
is efficient. Much of the time, Cooper points out, Silicon Valley
engineers’ schedule reflect a simple lack of planning: “Remarkably, poor
planning is reinterpreted as a test of will, a test of manhood for a team of
143
engineers.” Failure to delegate is widespread: “[M]ost of them don’t
144
know how to delegate,” one informant remarks of his colleagues. Also
accepted is overwork to the point of inefficiency: “My god, I mean, talk
about sweatshops. I mean, they are oblivious. The managers have no idea
what an altered state they are in all the time while they are managing
145
these guys.” Extensive research documents that sleep deprivation
corrodes performance, and that constant stress leads to higher health
146
insurance costs.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id. at 9 (quoting Kirk Sinclair).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id.
146. See Stanley Coren, Sleep Deprivation, Psychosis and Mental Efficiency, Psychiatric Times,
Mar. 1, 1998, at 15 (“People who are operating with a sleep debt are less efficient, and this inefficiency
is most noticeable when the circadian cycle is at its lowest ebb. Among the common consequences of a
large sleep debt are attentional lapses, reduced short-term memory capacity, impaired judgment and the
occurrence of ‘microsleeps.’”); Emily Tanner-Smith & Adam Long, The Stress-Health Connection and
Its Implications for Employers, Managed Care Outlook, May 15, 2008, at 21; Mary Corbitt Clark, The
Cost of Job Stress, Winning Workplaces (Feb. 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.winningworkplaces.org/
library/features/the_cost_of_job_stress.php (“Job stress is a key driver of health care costs. . . . [H]ealth
care expenditures are nearly 50 percent greater for workers reporting high levels of stress.”).
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All this holds important messages for feminism. If manhood is
forged on the job, then clearing up the confusion between masculine
gender performance and productivity becomes a crucial part of the
feminist agenda. So does developing the case law that allows men to sue
when gender discrimination against men is triggered by their perceived
147
failure to fulfill the mandated masculine role.
B. Litigating Separate Spheres Through Title VII
If one key component of reconstructive feminism is to change the
gender pressures that police men into the breadwinner role, another is to
change the gender pressures that police women out of that role, most
148
notably gender bias against mothers. Recent studies suggest that this
kind of “maternal wall” bias is alive and well. It may well be the
strongest form of gender discrimination in today’s workplace. The
leading study gave subjects resumes identical in every way except that
149
one, but not the other, was a mother. The study found that mothers were
79% less likely to be hired, 100% less likely to be promoted, offered an
average of $11,000 less in salary, and held to higher performance and
150
punctuality standards than otherwise identical nonmothers. Numerous
other studies confirm this finding, which suggests maternal wall bias
against mothers is by far the strongest type of gender bias, many times
151
stronger than the glass ceiling bias triggered by being a woman.
Separate spheres ideology operates to trigger strong negative
competence and commitment assumptions against mothers even if they
perform at precisely the same level they performed before they had
152
children. When mothers are perceived as ideal workers, another study
found, they nonetheless encounter bias at work based on the assumption
153
that if they are ideal workers, they must be bad mothers.
This sex-role stereotyping sometimes operates precisely the way the
stereotyping functioned in the ACLU cases of the 1970s: stereotyping
that stems from overgeneralization from the norm. “[S]tereotype is not a

147. See generally Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 Hastings L.J. 1297 (2012).
148. Acad. of Achievement, supra note 68, at 5 (“But what is very hard for most women is what
happens when children are born. Will men become equal parents, sharing the joys as well as the
burdens for bringing up the next generation? But that’s my dream for the world, for every child to
have two loving parents who share in raising the child.”).
149. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1309.
150. Id. at 1316 tbl.1.
151. See generally Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359 (2008) (reviewing the literature).
152. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1326.
153. Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty,
25 Gender & Soc’y 616, 621 (2010).
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synonym for mistake or false impression. It identifies the average,” read
Ginsburg’s 1974 brief in Califano v. Westcott, a case involving a challenge
to a welfare program that offered benefits to families with unemployed
154
fathers but not to those with unemployed mothers. In that same year,
the brief in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld noted that propositions such as that
“wives are typically dependent” (in Frontiero) and “men typically have
more business experience” (in Reed v. Reed) “concededly may be
155
reasonable as highly generalized solutions.”
The issue in all of those cases is the reasonableness of treating the
substantial population of individuals and families who do not match the
156
gross generalization as if they did match it. The 1978 brief in Orr v.
Orr, which involved a challenge to a state statute that offered alimony
only to women, argued, “The sharp sex line [the statute] draws reinforces
‘the role-typing society has long imposed’ upon men and women
[husband at work, wife at home] and invidiously discriminates against
157
spouses who do not conform to this type casting.” Again in the case
that became Frontiero v. Richardson, the brief noted, “The challenged
classification, which assumes that the man is the dominant partner in a
marriage and that the woman occupies a subordinate position . . . .
reinforce[s] restrictive and outdated sex-role stereotypes and penalize[s]
158
married women who do not conform to the assumed general pattern.”
Again in 1996, Ginsburg wrote, “I am fearful, or suspicious, of
generalizations about the way women or men are. My life’s experience
indicates that they cannot guide me reliably in making decisions about
159
particular individuals.”
Yet assumptions that exceptional mothers will conform to the norm
is only one way gender stereotyping works. Maternal wall bias also
disadvantages mothers in at least two other ways. As the studies by
Shelley Correll, Stephen Benard, In Paik, and their colleagues
demonstrate, maternal wall bias often stems from prescriptive bias, in the
form of backlash against mothers who are seen as too devoted to work,
in violation of the prescription that mothers’ lives should revolve around
160
their children. A third form of maternal wall bias reflects the automatic
association of mothers with a lack of workplace competence and
commitment, which reflects separate spheres’ linkage of motherhood
154. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae at 32, Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (No.78-689).
155. Brief for Appellee, supra note 70, at 18 n.11.
156. Id. at 18 n.12.
157. Motion of ACLU, supra note 79, at 13 (citation omitted) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975)).
158. Brief of ACLU, supra note 17, at 24.
159. Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 148.
160. See Benard & Correll, supra note 153, at 1385; Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1326.
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161

with family work, not market work. The social science has progressed
far beyond where it was in the 1970s.
This new social science paved the way for the EEOC’s 2007
enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination, which asserted that
162
discrimination against caregivers is a form of gender discrimination.
This was important because, in some prior case law, employers faced
with a lawsuit charging discrimination against mothers promoted a
woman without children and claimed that action as proof they were not
163
discriminating against women. The EEOC’s guidance also helped to
address situations where mothers’ lawsuits were dismissed on the
grounds that the plaintiff could point to no similarly situated man
164
(“comparator”). By clearly stating that caregiver-bias lawsuits could be
proven through stereotyping evidence alone, even in the absence of a
165
The EEOC’s
comparator, the EEOC addressed these problems.
embrace of stereotyping evidence was important not only because
comparators can be difficult to find, but also because stereotyping often
is easy to prove. In the landmark early case of Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free School District, a school psychologist was told that
she was not a suitable candidate for tenure because “[she] had little ones
166
at home.” Many other cases involve open bias against mothers, as when
an employer told a car salesman she should “do the right thing” and stay
home with her children, and that as a woman with a family she would
167
always be at a disadvantage at the dealership. The prevalence of such
comments in the case law suggests they are common in today’s
168
workplace.
Family responsibilities discrimination cases increased almost 400%
in the ten years from 1999 to 2009, and have higher success rates than do
169
A recent important
most other forms of employment litigation.
development is a large class-action win: A jury awarded $256 million

161. Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at 1306.
162. EEOC, supra note 12, § II.
163. E.g., Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
164. Compare Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 739 (1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s
“failure to present any comparator evidence doomed her case” despite having been told that she was
terminated because the human resources manager did not believe she would return to work after
maternity leave), with EEOC, supra note 12, § II(A)(3) (discussing assumptions about the work
performance of female caregivers).
165. EEOC, supra note 12, § II(A)(3).
166. 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original).
167. Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at *1 (D. Minn.
Aug. 13, 2004).
168. See generally Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The Ctr. for WorkLife Law, Family
Responsibilities Discrimination: Litigation Update 2010 (2010); Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Gary
Phelan & Joan C. Williams, Family Responsibilities Discrimination (forthcoming 2012).
169. Calvert, supra note 168, at 9, 11.
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against Novartis in a case that combined caregiver discrimination with
sexual harassment and other, more conventional forms of gender
170
discrimination.
I will conclude this Article with a discussion of a recent pattern-andpractice case out of the Southern District of New York, EEOC v.
171
Bloomberg L.P., which represents a setback for mothers and raises
issues straight out of the Ginsburg briefs of the 1970s. Ample evidence in
Bloomberg illustrated that the maternal wall bias was particularly strong,
172
according to allegations by the claimants. All of the statements that
follow are based on these allegations. When one claimant told former
boss Michael Bloomberg she was pregnant, his answer was a simple: “kill
173
it.” Allowing mothers flexible work arrangements, he reportedly
174
commented, was like allowing a man time off to practice his golf swing.
The CEO who took over after Bloomberg left the company, Lex
Fenwick, allegedly demanded that managers “get rid of these pregnant
175
bitches” (referring to two women on maternity leave). In response to a
human resources manager who complained about this outburst, Fenwick
asked, “[W]ell, is every fucking woman in the company having a baby or
176
going to have a baby?” Fenwick also opined that, unless mother or
child has a health issue, “there’s absolutely no reason for someone to
177
take paternity leave.” The Head of News commented that “half these
fuckin’ people take the [maternity] leave and they don’t even come back.
It’s like stealing money from Mike Bloomberg’s wallet. It’s theft. They
178
should be arrested.” The Head of Global Data allegedly asked, “Who
179
would want to work with an office full of women?” When a female
employee complained to the President of Tradebook Sales about her
180
pay, he asked, “[C]an’t you just be happy being pregnant?” These
comments suggest that the separate spheres ideology was alive and well
at Bloomberg.

170. Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The case subsequently
settled for $175 million. Judy Greenwald, In 2010, Bias Cases Dominate Employment Legal
Landscape, Bus. Ins., Jan. 10, 2011, at 4.
171. 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
172. EEOC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Bloomberg L.P.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to EEOC’s Pattern-or-Practice Claim, Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (No. 078383).
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. at 4.
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Yet federal Judge Loretta Preska granted summary judgment for
Bloomberg in an opinion that seemed designed to clear Bloomberg’s
reputation in the press. “In a heralded complaint,” her opinion begins,
“the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission accused
Bloomberg L.P. of engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination
against pregnant employees or those who have recently returned from
maternity leave . . . . However, ‘J’accuse!’ is not enough in court.
181
Evidence is required.” She continued: “As its standard operating
procedure Bloomberg increased compensation for women returning
from maternity leave more than for those who took similarly lengthy
leaves and did not reduce the responsibilities of women returning from
maternity leave any more than of those who took similarly lengthy
182
leaves.”
The informed reader is left wondering whether Judge Preska is
reaching a merits determination after weighing competing evidence. If
so, that is an intriguing development in a motion for summary judgment,
a situation in which the judge is not authorized to weigh competing
versions of the facts. Of course, a news reporter reading the decision
typically would know none of this.
The beginning of Judge Preska’s opinion (the part reporters would
183
read) intimates that the EEOC had no, or very little, evidence. The
opinion presents the statistical evidence of Bloomberg’s experts,
followed by the statement that, “[a]gainst this data, the EEOC has
presented anecdotal testimony from several claimants stating that they
184
were discriminated against in terms of compensation.” This makes it
sound as if the EEOC had submitted no statistical evidence. Only much
later, in a footnote, does Judge Preska mention that the reason the
EEOC had only anecdotal evidence is that Judge Preska had excluded all
185
of the EEOC’s expert evidence while allowing in all of Bloomberg’s.
Even in that footnote, Judge Preska makes it sound as if the EEOC’s
experts agreed with the conclusions of Bloomberg’s expert, which they
did not: “The EEOC disputes the ‘analysis’ of [Bloomberg’s] experts, but
186
it does not dispute the statements contained in the reports.” Only one
of the many shocking statements by officers at the highest levels of
Bloomberg is mentioned, and it is buried toward the end of the

181. EEOC v. Bloomberg, L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
182. Id. at 462.
183. Id. at 461–62.
184. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 464 n.3. The EEOC’s statistical evidence compared mothers to other leave-takers and
found pay and promotion discrimination against mothers. EEOC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant’s Bloomberg L.P.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 172, at 15, 18.
186. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.3.
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187

opinion.
Instead, Judge Preska intimates that the EEOC’s case
consisted of colorless claims by certain class members that they were not
promoted or that their compensation was decreased following their
return from maternity leave, and concludes, “Generally, all of these
assertions, taken together, boil down to the EEOC’s conclusion that
Bloomberg management is predominantly male, and has tended to
follow Wall Street’s model of having few women in top management
188
positions.”
Bloomberg’s lawyers argued successfully to exclude many of the
statements quoted above on the grounds that they were hearsay. Judge
Preska’s opinion neglects to mention that many of the offending
statements were made by high-ranking company officials. Surely such
highly placed officials had authority to make these statements or made
them within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, those
189
statements were party admissions—not hearsay. Other key statements,
such as the statement by the head of human resources that “the problem
with women is that they go off and have babies,” were not hearsay
because they were not offered to prove that women irresponsibly go off
190
and have babies, but rather to show the speaker’s bias. Again, Judge
Preska’s opinion functions quite nicely to send the message to the world
that Bloomberg’s reputation had been unjustly besmirched.
What Judge Preska appeared to be concerned about was the
“inflammatory” nature of the statements by high-level Bloomberg
corporate officials. One wonders whether the jury would have been
inflamed—and, if so, whether it would have been due to the blatantly
discriminatory nature of many of the comments of managers at
Bloomberg. The legal issue is whether the potential prejudice substantially
191
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. If the judge’s opinion had
focused on this issue, however, it would not have succeeded in conveying
the message that Bloomberg’s reputation had been unjustly besmirched.
Even more troubling is the little sermon Judge Preska offered at the
end of her opinion. “At bottom, the EEOC’s theory of this case is about
so-called ‘work-life balance.’. . . [The EEOC’s claim] amounts to a
judgment that Bloomberg, as a company policy, does not provide its
192
employee-mothers with a sufficient work-life balance.” She quotes
187. Id. at 479.
188. Id. at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (providing that party admissions are not hearsay, and that when a
corporation is a party opponent, a declarant’s statement is not hearsay if made while she was acting
within her scope of employment or with proper authority).
190. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(c) (providing that a statement not introduced to prove the truth of the
matter asserted cannot be hearsay).
191. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
192. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
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former General Electric CEO Jack Welch: “‘There’s no such thing as
work-life balance. There are work-life choices, and you make them, and
193
they have consequences.’” Judge Preska defends Mr. Welch’s view,
which (she says) “reflects the free-market employment system we
embrace in the United States,” although she then goes on to say it is not
the role of judges “to engage in policy debates” and that “[t]he law does
not mandate ‘work-life balance.’ It does not require companies to ignore
employees’ work-family tradeoffs—and they are tradeoffs—when
194
deciding about employee pay and promotions.”
This sermon takes us back to the Ginsburg briefs of the 1970s and
the principle that it is discrimination to treat women who do not conform
to stereotypes according to the assumption that all women will conform
195
to the norm. The claimants in this case were not asking for work-life
balance. They were asking that their employer not discriminate against
them because they were mothers: not to insult them, exclude them from
meetings, depress their pay, cease their promotions, or subject them to
rigid rules that were not applied to nonmothers. Remember the studies
by Correll, Benard, and Paik: Mothers with identical resumes were 100%
less likely to be promoted, offered much lower pay, and held to higher
196
performance standards. The issue here is not a desire for work-life
balance, but breathtaking evidence of the strongest and most open form
of discrimination against women.
The most disturbing thing about Judge Preska’s sermon, however, is
the insight it provides into her ruling in the Daubert motion in which she
excluded the evidence of the EEOC’s experts—the ruling that in effect
decided the case. The EEOC’s statistical evidence used maternity leave
as a proxy for motherhood and compared the wage growth of women
who had taken maternity leave with that of everyone at Bloomberg who
197
had not taken maternity leave. In an unusual move, the judge ruled this
198
evidence inadmissible.
Judge Preska took the step of excluding the EEOC’s statistical
199
evidence because she said it compared the wrong groups. She admitted

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. Fam. L.
347, 349 (1971) (“As long as a woman’s access to equal opportunity could be barred by unproved
assumptions concerning her inherent disqualifications, she would have no chance to prove those
assumptions false.”).
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2010 WL 3466370, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2011) (order excluding testimony).
198. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.3.
199. Bloomberg, 2010 WL 3466370, at *12 (“[The EEOC’s expert] does not accurately compare
class members to other similarly situated Bloomberg employees . . . .”).
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only the evidence from Bloomberg’s statistical expert, which compared
mothers who had taken leave with other employees who had taken
leaves of sixty days or more, arguing that this was the correct analysis “to
compare the class members to similarly situated employees, namely,
200
those who have taken a substantial amount of leave.” Judge Preska not
only considered this the relevant comparison, she considered the
comparison proposed by EEOC’s expert so flawed that his evidence
201
should not even be submitted to a jury.
There are several problems with her analysis. The first is that this
comparison is not probative. Comparing leave-takers to leave-takers may
simply tell you that all leave-takers are being discriminated against, or
that employees who take maternity leave are being discriminated against
a little more or a little less than are those who take leave due to other
serious medical conditions. The fact that leave-takers often are
discriminated against is so well established that Congress noted it, and
202
prohibited it, in the FMLA.
A related problem with Judge Preska’s proposed methodology is
that courts have rejected regression analyses that use, as controls,
variables that themselves may be affected by the discrimination that is
being challenged. Thus in James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, a
defendant in a race-based wage discrimination case used “skill level” and
“merit rating” as two factors that helped explain the contested wage
203
differentials. The court rejected this analysis on the grounds that the
evidence suggested that African Americans were given lower-skilled jobs
204
and lower merit ratings because of race. This is sometimes referred to
205
as the problem of “tainted variables.” In Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., a
court rejected a regression analysis that controlled for what job the
plaintiffs started in, on the grounds that because women were
discriminated against at the time of hiring, controlling for starting job
was a tainted variable, “one whose value is affected by discrimination
206
and has the effect of concealing disparities due to discrimination.”
Similarly, a regression analysis that compares leave-takers to leavetakers is tainted by the discrimination against both mothers and
individuals with disabilities (the other group most likely to take long
leaves).

200. Id. at *7.
201. Id. at *12.
202. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2010).
203. 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977).
204. Id. at 349.
205. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C–94–4335 SI, C–95–2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *10 n.21
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997).
206. Id.
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A third problem with Judge Preska’s insistence on comparing leavetakers to leave-takers, rather than mothers to others, lies in her
underlying assumption that employees who have taken leave are not
comparable, by definition, to those who have never taken leave because
they are less productive, less dependable, and less committed. She quotes
with approval the statement of a Bloomberg expert who said, “If a long
leave has some lasting effect on performance-related factors, such as
productivity, and therefore on pay, employees with a recent long
leave . . . are not similarly situated to employees who have never been on
207
a long leave.” This assumption (without proof from the individual
workplace in question) that women are less productive once they become
mothers is precisely the kind of maternal wall stereotyping that courts
are supposed to be protecting plaintiffs against.
But the problems do not end there. In light of the judge’s sermon
about work-life balance, the reasons behind her Daubert ruling become
clear: She is assuming that an employer is entitled to act on an unproven
assumption that anyone who takes leave will, upon their return, be less
productive than anyone who has not taken leave. But acting on that
assumption without proof violates the FMLA, which prohibits retaliation
208
against anyone who has taken a federally protected leave. In essence,
Judge Preska not only has forgotten that the FMLA prohibits retaliation
against leave-takers, she also puts her seal of approval on precisely this
kind of retaliation.
Judge Preska opines that the plaintiffs’ proposed comparison between
women who have returned from maternity leave and everyone else at
Bloomberg violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act because it offers
209
special treatment to pregnant women. But it offers special treatment to
women returning from maternity leave only if an employer is prohibited
from discriminating or retaliating against mothers for taking leave in a
context where the employer is free to discriminate or retaliate against
others for taking leave. But, again, the FMLA prohibits discrimination or
210
retaliation against anyone who takes a protected leave. Therefore, after
passage of the FMLA in 1994, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s
insistence that pregnant women be treated “the same” as other employees
amounts to a requirement that pregnant women (along with other
employees) not be penalized due to the unsupported assumption that they
will be less productive upon their return to work.

207. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2010 WL 3466370, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2011) (order excluding testimony).
208. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2010); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (2011) (describing the FMLA’s prohibitions
against discrimination and retaliation for taking FMLA leave).
209. Bloomberg, 2010 WL 3466370, at *7.
210. See U.S.C. § 2615; 29 C.F.R. 825.220.
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Suffice it to say that the analysis in Bloomberg is severely flawed.
Any employer who relies on the key evidentiary ruling in Bloomberg will
weaken its case: Insisting in a maternal wall case that the correct
comparison is between mothers and other leave-takers because the
careers of all leave-takers stall out is a virtual admission that the
211
company has violated the FMLA.
This all brings us back to Justice Ginsburg’s unfinished agenda: to
ensure that the law does not function to police women into the domestic
sphere and men out of it. Justice Ginsburg began this process by
eliminating government programs that explicitly embraced separate
spheres. But the ACLU cases of the 1970s were only an initial victory in
a much larger campaign. Today, family responsibilities cases are the front
line in contesting separate spheres. The EEOC’s enforcement guidance
on caregiver discrimination articulated a reasonable set of rules about
how maternal wall suits should be litigated, highlighting the use of
stereotyping evidence in order to avoid just the kind of thing that
212
happened in Bloomberg. Judge Preska ignored the EEOC’s guidance;
by doing so, she fell into the old-fashioned kind of stereotyping Justice
Ginsburg taught us to avoid.

Conclusion
To return to Judge Preska’s opinion, recall her assertion that “[t]he
law does not mandate ‘work-life balance.’ It does not require companies
to ignore employees’ work-family tradeoffs—and they are tradeoffs—
213
when deciding about employee pay and promotions.” That’s true. But
what employers are not allowed to do is discriminate against one group
of mothers because a different group of mothers decided to leave the fast
track. As Ginsburg taught us long ago, you cannot penalize women who
do not conform to stereotypes just because other women do conform.
We abandon this basic principle at our peril. Doing so would be a truly
devastating setback for women, given that studies show that what dooms
women economically in the United States today is not being a woman—it
214
is being a mother. If the courts refuse to protect mothers on the fast
211. The reason the choice of comparators is so important is that if the correct comparison is
between mothers and other people who have taken long leaves, then this will often mean that a
mother’s case will fail due to her inability to find a suitable comparator or (in a class action) a
sufficient number of comparators such that she can produce a statistically reliable comparison. This
takes mothers right back to where they were a decade ago: with no practical way to contest the
strongest form of gender discrimination in today’s workplace.
212. EEOC, supra note 12.
213. EEOC v. Bloomberg, L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
214. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc. Rev.
204 (2001) (finding a significant wage penalty); see also Correll, Benard & Paik, supra note 11, at
1299–1300 (reviewing the literature).
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track simply because other mothers left the fast track, Justice Ginsburg’s
reconstructive vision will remain elusive. That’s for damn sure.

